Taking the Paris Principles to Asia. A Study of Three Human Rights Commissions in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines by Stokke, Hugo
CMIREPORT
Taking the Paris Principles to Asia
A study of three human rights commissions in 
Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines
Hugo Stokke
R 2007: 3

 
 
 
 
 
Taking the Paris Principles to Asia 
 
A study of three human rights commissions in 
Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines 
 
 
 
 
Hugo Stokke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R 2007: 3 
 
 
  
CMI Reports 
This series can be ordered from: 
Chr. Michelsen Institute 
P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen, 
N-5892 Bergen, Norway 
Tel: + 47 55 57 40 00 
Fax: + 47 55 57 41 66 
E-mail: cmi@cmi.no 
www.cmi.no 
 
Price: NOK 50 
 
ISSN 0805-505X 
ISBN 978-82-8062-171-9 
This report is also available at: 
www.cmi.no/publications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indexing terms 
Human  rights 
Southeast Asia 
Philippines 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
 
Project number 
23077 
 
 
Project title 
Human Rights Commissions in Southeast Asia 
  iii
Contents 
 
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................... 1 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS........ 2 
3. THE PARIS PRINCIPLES.......................................................................................................................... 3 
4. SELECTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND METHOD OF ASSESSMENT .............................................. 5 
5. THREE SOUTHEAST ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS..................................................... 7 
5.1 COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS – THE PHILIPPINES ................................................................................ 7 
5.1.1 Legal foundation ............................................................................................................................... 7 
5.1.2 Composition ...................................................................................................................................... 8 
5.1.3 Financial and operational independence.......................................................................................... 8 
5.1.4 Mandate ............................................................................................................................................ 9 
5.1.5 Operational priorities ..................................................................................................................... 11 
5.1.6 Effectiveness and impact ................................................................................................................. 12 
5.2 SUHAKAM – THE MALAYSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ............................................................. 13 
5.2.1 Legal foundation ............................................................................................................................. 13 
5.2.2 Composition .................................................................................................................................... 13 
5.2.3 Financial and operational independence........................................................................................ 14 
5.2.4 Mandate .......................................................................................................................................... 14 
5.2.5 Operational priorities ..................................................................................................................... 16 
5.2.6 Effectiveness and impact ................................................................................................................. 16 
5.3 KOMNAS HAM – THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ......................................................... 17 
5.3.1 Legal foundation ............................................................................................................................. 17 
5.3.2 Composition .................................................................................................................................... 17 
5.3.3 Financial and operational independence........................................................................................ 18 
5.3.4 Mandate .......................................................................................................................................... 18 
5.3.5 Operational priorities ..................................................................................................................... 20 
5.3.6 Effectiveness and impact ................................................................................................................. 20 
6. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS .......................................................................................................... 21 
 
  
 
 
CMI REPORT TAKING THE PARIS PRINCIPLES TO ASIA R 2007: 3 
 1 
1. Introduction1 
The purpose of this study is to make an assessment of the implementation of the so-called Paris 
Principles in three Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The 
Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (or the “Paris Principles” in brief) is the 
international standard for assessing the structure, competence, working procedure and other features 
of national human rights institutions. These principles provide guidelines for how institutions are to 
be independent from government and to reflect the pluralism of society in its membership. They 
address both promotional and protective aspects of the mandate of the institutions and add 
principles concerning the quasi-jurisdictional competence of those commissions possessing such 
powers.  
 
Taking the Principles as the point of departure, this study shall make a qualitative assessment of 
how well the Principles have been followed in three commissions in three Southeast Asian 
countries. The Southeast region has been selected for being a region in rapid development with 
some countries graduating to a more advanced state of development. The three countries selected 
are all at an intermediate stage in the development process with Malaysia having come further in 
terms of GDP per capita than the other two larger countries.  
 
As the Principles are quite generally formulated, the assessment is more of a qualitative than of a 
quantitative kind. However, selecting three commissions does allow some scope for comparison 
among them. Even though the comparison may not be quantitative in kind, a checklist shall be 
devised so as to indicate similarities and differences among the three. Following the structure of the 
Principles, the checklist will address competence and responsibilities, composition, independence 
and pluralism, methods of operation and the question and extent of quasi-jurisdictional competence.  
Of course, such a checklist comparison has to be based on a more descriptive account of each of the 
commissions, and this account precedes the checklist.  
 
Before describing the functions of the three commissions, a historical account shall be given of the 
evolution of guidelines for national human rights institutions and a discussion of the actual 
substance of the Principles. The question may be asked why these institutions are important given 
an international treaty system and an extensive monitoring apparatus attached to each of the treaties. 
Furthermore, given a judiciary in each country, why is there a need for a commission? Given an 
array of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), why should there be a commission if these NGOs 
are capable of channeling demands and claims and complaints to different parts of the state, 
whether it is the government, parliament or the courts? In other words, a rationale for establishing 
national human rights commissions has to be made and the rationale should be found by examining 
the evolution towards a definitive set of principles at the international level. The key question is 
identifying the competence and powers of this type of institution in relation to the branches of the 
state on the one hand and the plurality of civil society and its organised (and less organised) 
interests on the other. 
 
After looking at the evolution of principles and guidelines and their final formulation in the Paris 
Principles, the study goes on to assess their implementation in Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. The discussion is followed by a summary checklist in order to facilitate comparisons 
among them. A checklist approach may also serve to identify common constraints that prevent the 
commissions from fully implementing the Principles, provided that such constraints do exist in 
                                                     
1 This study was financed by a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs which enabled visits to the human 
rights commissions of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
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practice. Finally, a concluding section sums up the discussions and comparisons with a view to 
finding the key characteristics of the institutions enabling them to (or constraining them from) fully 
promoting and protecting human rights. 
2. The evolution of guidelines for national human rights 
institutions 
The initial discussions on establishing national human rights institutions go right back to the 
beginning of the United Nations. As early as 1946, a resolution by the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) invited member states to consider the desirability of establishing 
local information groups or human rights committees to serve as vehicles for collaboration with the 
United Nations Commission.2 The issue of local bodies was raised again in 1960 and an ECOSOC 
resolution was adopted, going beyond the role of providing a contact point for the UN locally and 
encouraging active participation in and monitoring of the local situation.3 With expanding UN 
standard-setting in the 1960s and 1970s, the role of national institutions as a vehicle for promotion 
of standards was recognised, inter alia, by organising a seminar in Geneva in 1978 on “national and 
local institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights”.  This seminar was significant 
because it opened for an active role of institutions in reviewing national policy on human rights, 
covering legislation as well as implementation through the administration and the courts. This 
development marked a step beyond the previous more limited function of information and 
awareness-raising. The recommendation of ensuring a representative cross-section of society in the 
composition of the institutions was another addition to the tasks of a national human rights 
institution.  
 
General Assembly resolutions drew attention to the importance of securing the integrity and 
independence of the institutions4 and provided for a broad mandate in which the consideration of 
civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights should be equally important. 
This broad mandate was intended for the institutions to go beyond an exclusive focus on civil and 
political rights and judicial procedures. The potential danger of a very broad mandate, however, is 
that the institutions may lose focus and hence create a problem of differentiating a human rights 
commission from other commissions tasked with monitoring other areas of public governance. In 
the first reports of the Secretary General in 1981 and 1983 on  National Human Rights Institutions, 
the range of activities are listed without specifying the legal and organisational framework of the 
institutions themselves. Briefly, the activities can be sorted into two classes: the functions of 
protection and promotion.   
 
The function of protection covers a broad range of tasks, including investigating complaints, 
seeking settlements, referring matters to the courts or public prosecutors, providing legal 
counselling etc. It did not include the competence to issue final decisions or to undertake 
independent investigations on their own initiative. A distinction is made between judicial and non-
judicial bodies, though it is not clear from the distinction whether human rights commissions are to 
be classified as the former or the latter.  The function of promotion is similarly broad-ranging, from 
advocating appropriate legislation and participating in public awareness campaigns to working with 
                                                     
2 See ECOSOC Resolution 2/9 of 21 June 1946. This section relies on Birgit Lindsnæs and Lone Lindholt, “National 
Human Rights Institutions – Standard Setting and Achievements, in Birgit Lindsnæs, Lone Lindholt and Kristine Yigen 
(eds.), National Human Rights Institutions. Articles and Working Papers (Copenhagen, Danish Centre for Human Rights, 
2001), pp. 1 – 48. Also previously published in Hugo Stokke and Arne Tostensen (eds.); Human Rights in Development 
Yearbook 1998. Global Perspectives and Local Issues (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998). 
3 ECOSOC Resolution 772 B (XXX) of 25 July 1960. 
4 A/RES/36/134 of 14 December 1981. 
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educational and other public institutions in disseminating information about human rights and the 
work of the commissions and to take actions to safeguard the rights of special groups. 
3. The Paris Principles 
The standard-setting process did not reach fruition until the holding of the first International 
Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Paris, 7–9 
October 1991. The workshop resulted in a set of principles and guidelines briefly titled the Paris 
Principles which was adopted by the Human Rights Commission the following year.5 The 
Principles are divided into four main sections, dealing with  
 
(1) competence and responsibilities; 
(2) composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism;  
(3) methods of operation; and  
(4) additional principles concerning the status of commissions with quasi-jurisdictional competence. 
 
Regarding the competence and responsibilities of national institutions, they have, as stated above, 
the competence to promote and protect human rights. The mandate is to be as broad as possible and 
to be set out in a constitutional or other legislative text, specifying composition and competence. 
The responsibilities are laid out in a series of paragraphs which, however, are not meant to be 
exhaustive. Briefly, they are as follows: 
 
(a) To submit to government, parliament or other competent authority opinions, 
recommendations, proposals, reports on any matter relating to the promotion and protection 
of human rights, whether on request or on own initiative. These shall be related to the 
following areas: 
(i) legislative and administrative provisions of pertinence to the promotion and 
protection of human rights, including the amendment of such legislation and 
administrative provisions: 
(ii) any violation of human rights; 
(iii) the preparation of national reports on human rights generally and specifically; 
(iv) drawing the attention of the government to human rights violations in any part of 
the country and proposing initiatives to stop such violations and monitoring 
government efforts towards that end; 
(b) To promote and ensure harmonisation of national legislation with international instruments 
ratified by the state; 
(c) To promote ratification of international instruments and to ensure implementation; 
(d) To contribute to state reporting on ratified international instruments and to the extent 
necessary, to comment on state reporting; 
(e) To cooperate with the UN, regional and other national institutions competent in the areas of 
promotion and protection of human rights; 
(f) To take part in programming for teaching and doing research on human rights in schools, 
universities and in the professions; 
(g) To take part in public awareness creation about human rights through information and 
education. 
 
These sets of responsibilities are basically promotional. The institutions have an assisting role by 
helping the government in various ways to ensure that human rights broadly and specifically are 
                                                     
5 Principles relating to the status of national institutions, UN Commission of Human Rights Resolution 1992/54 of 3 
March 1992, annex (E/1992/22). 
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promoted and protected. The final section of the Principles concerns the quasi-jurisdictional status 
of the commissions which specifies the extent to which the commissions also have a protective 
function to directly ensure the respect of human rights. As we shall see, this function is hedged with 
qualifications.  
 
Having said so far what national institutions shall do, who are the right persons to do it and under 
what conditions? The Paris Principles include a section on the composition and guarantees of 
independence and pluralism of the institutions. The main point regarding the composition of the 
institutions is “to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian society) 
involved in the promotion and protection of human rights”. Specifically, social forces are to be 
included, as members or as cooperating partners, non-governmental organisations, including trade 
unions and professional associations; representatives of trends in philosophical and religious 
thought; universities and qualified experts; parliament; and government departments (latter 
members only in an advisory capacity).  
 
The institutions have to be guaranteed an adequate infrastructure, particularly adequate funding, in 
order to employ staff, to ensure independence from government and to be secure from financial 
controls.  
 
The mandate of members shall have to be regulated by an official legal act, specifying the duration 
of the mandate and its renewal, provided that the independence of members are ensured.  
 
Keywords regarding composition and operability are pluralism and independence. Institutions have 
to be as representative of society as possible and as free from financial and administrative controls 
as possible to the extent that these controls can be used to exert governmental pressure on the 
operations of the institutions.  
 
The Principles go on to provide guidelines for the methods of operation of the institutions.  These 
are as follows: 
  
(a) freely consider any question falling within its competence, whether submitted by 
government, petitioner or on its own accord;  
(b) hear any person or obtain any information necessary to assess the situation;  
(c) address the public directly or through the media;  
(d) meet regularly, if necessary, with all members present;  
(e) establish working groups and local/regional sections;  
(f) maintain consultations with jurisdictional and other bodies of relevance for the promotion 
and protection of human rights; and  
(g) develop relations to non-governmental organisations devoted to promoting and protecting 
human rights and the opportunities of vulnerable groups. 
 
The guidelines on methods show that institutions need not be purely reactive; they can of their own 
choosing adopt a much more proactive posture and take up and pursue any question falling within 
their competence. As the institutions are public institutions, though not governmental, they can offer 
as intermediaries a channel into the government if they develop good relations with non-
governmental organisations and if these NGOs see the utility of the institutions as a channel for 
their petitions and complaints.  
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Finally, the Principles offer guidelines concerning the status of commissions with quasi-
jurisdictional competence.6 Institutions may be authorised to hear and consider petitions and 
complaints concerning individual situations, brought before it by individuals, third parties, NGOs, 
trade unions and other representative organisations. In these circumstances, the commissions may 
be entrusted with the following principles: 
 
(a) Seeking an amicable settlement through conciliation or, within the limits prescribed by 
law, through binding decisions or, where necessary, on the basis of confidentiality; 
(b) Informing the party who filed the petition of his rights, in particular the remedies available 
to him, and promoting his access to them; 
(c) Hearing any complaints or petitions or transmitting them to any other competent authority 
within the limits prescribed by law; 
(d) Making recommendations to the competent authorities, especially by proposing 
amendments or reforms of the laws, regulations and administrative practices, especially if 
they have created the difficulties encountered by the persons filing the petitions in order to 
assert their rights 
 
These additional principles are important in specifying the extent to which the institutions have 
protective powers on top of the considerable promotional powers vested in them. The principles are 
careful in avoiding language that may indicate that the competence of commissions overlaps with 
that of the courts. Commissions may assist in seeking legal remedies, transmit complaints to other 
competent authorities or make recommendations on law amendments or even seek binding 
decisions through conciliation, but outside the courts. The commissions have no powers to apply the 
law, not even within their fields of competence. That task rests entirely with the courts.  
 
These are then the Principles which represent the international consensus on the framework, 
mandate, composition, operations and powers of the national human rights institutions. They 
represent the yardstick by which to assess the structure and operations of the institutions.  
4. Selection of institutions and method of assessment 
The first national institutions were set up in the 1970s in New Zealand and Canada (both 1978). 
Several countries joined in the 1980s, but it was only in the 1990s that institutions mushroomed 
across the world with newcomers appearing on all continents. Currently, there are, according to 
database information, 23 institutions in Africa, 17 in the Americas, 17 in Asia and the Pacific and 
22 in Europe.7 Adding up, a total of 79 institutions have been established so far and most of them 
after the adoption of the Paris Principles.8  
 
                                                     
6 Lindsnaes and Lindholt (2000) are puzzled by the use of the term quasi-jurisdictional instead of the more apposite quasi-
judicial which has a precise meaning in legal dictionaries. The latter refers to “a function that resembles the legal function 
in that it involves deciding a dispute and ascertaining the facts and any relevant law, but differs in that it depends 
ultimately on the exercise on an executive discretion rather than in the application of the law” (quoted from the The 
Concise Dictionary of Law, Oxford University Press, 1986), whereas the former appears to have no legal reference. The 
former term has been retained in later UN reference works which does speak to the power of legal precedence! 
7 Data available from National Human Rights Institutions Forum at  
http://www.nhri.net/pdf/List_Accredited_NIs_Nov_2006.pdf, a web site hosted by the Danish Institute of Human Rights. 
8 It should be noted that not all are national human rights institutions in the specific sense of the Principles. Some are 
national ombudsman offices, others are public defenders and yet others have a narrower mandate than that recommended 
by the Principles, focusing specifically on ethnic discrimination and people with disabilities, to take but two examples. 
Different types of accreditation apply for the various institutions.  
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In the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand was first to set up a national human rights institution in 
1978, followed by Australia in 1981 and the Philippines in 1987. As of November 2006, 17 
institutions are registered in the following countries: Australia, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Palestine, Philippines, 
Qatar, The Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand. As will be evident from perusing the list, a 
number of countries do not have a national human rights institution, notably the People’s Republic 
of China.9 Yet, the idea of national institutions appears to have caught on with a clear majority of 
countries of the region having their own from the 1990s onwards.10  
 
In selecting the institutions for closer scrutiny, we have selected institutions that have been 
accredited as being in conformity with the Paris Principles. Further, it may be an advantage to zero 
in on a sub-region and here the Southeast Asian (or the ASEAN) region has been selected as there 
may be more commonalities (in size, wealth and population) among the ASEAN countries than in 
other sub-regions of Asia and the Pacific. Altogether four institutions have been set up as of today, 
in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. No institutions are yet in place in Burma, Lao 
PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam and Brunei and as far as is known, no plans are afoot for their 
establishment. Out of the four, Thailand’s commission is the most recent and its enabling act was 
adopted only in 1999. However, the impetus for a commission came with the promulgation of a new 
constitution in 1997 which provided for the full guarantee of human dignity and basic rights as well 
as fundamental freedoms for its people. Malaysia’s commission is also fairly recent with its 
enabling law also dating from 1999 and its formal establishment in 2000. As there is more easily 
and readily available information on the Malaysian commission than for the Thai commission, it 
was selected for closer study. In comparison, the Philippine commission dates back to 1987 and the 
Indonesian commission to 1993.  
 
All four Southeast Asian institutions are members of the Asia Pacific Forum for National Human 
Rights Institutions which serves as a regional forum as well as a provider of support and services for 
the national institutions throughout the region. More specifically for the Southeast Asian region, the 
national human rights institutions may have an additional role to play alongside activists and 
lobbyists for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, an initiative that was initially conceived at an 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1993, after the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action on 25 June that year. A Working Group on an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism was set 
up to liaise and lobby at the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings and to meet regularly in between these 
official meetings. The working group drafted in 2000 an outline of an ASEAN human rights 
commission.11 These activities at both the regional and sub-regional levels make Southeast Asia an 
interesting region for testing the application of the Paris Principles.  
 
How to assess the application of the Principles? An assessment will have to encompass the legal 
framework, the mandate, the composition, the independence, the operations and to the extent 
possible, some estimate of the effectiveness of the commissions in changing the human rights 
situation for the better. The assessment of performance and impact is strictly speaking beyond the 
scope of the Paris Principles which speak to the structural and formal requirements of national 
human rights institutions. Nonetheless, all three commissions are subject to running assessments of 
                                                     
9 Most of the institutions have been given an A accreditation with the Palestinian given an A(R), Qatar and Jordan a B and 
the Iranian commission a C. Only those with an A accreditation are regarded as being in conformity with the Principles. 
The A (R) category indicates that the information provided is insufficient for assessment; B denotes not fully conformant 
or lack of information and C is non-conformant.  
10 The database provides useful contact information for the national institutions, but not their year of establishment or the 
year of the enabling law. 
11 See ASEAN and Human Rights. A Compilation of ASEAN Statements on Human Rights. Manila, the Philippines, 
Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, Atteneo Human Rights Center, Atteneo de Manila University, 
2003). For updated information, check http://www.aseanhrmech.org/.  
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their performance, either informally by concerned members of the public or more formally by 
evaluations and performance assessments. The latter exercises may give rise to organisational 
restructuring in order to better achieve the objectives of the Paris Principles and heighten 
effectiveness and impact.  
 
In brief, the assessment by this study will examine the following points: 
 
(a) legal basis; 
(b) composition, including the pluralistic representation of society; 
(c) independence, financial and operational; 
(d) mandate, including quasi-judicial, if applicable; 
(e) operational priorities: which (categories of) human rights are given priority and why; 
(f) assessment of effectiveness based on performance; 
(g) assessment of impact, to the extent possible. 
 
The latter two points are from the point of view of the Principles of less importance than the others, 
yet considered essential for evaluations, so they have been included here as add-ons. In the 
following, each of the commissions will be treated separately, but in a concluding section, some key 
points will be singled out so as to make comparisons between them. The purpose of the 
comparisons is not to establish any ranking order, but to see if there are elements, common or 
disparate, which may be susceptible to broader generalisation.  
5. Three Southeast Asian human rights commissions 
5.1 Commission on Human Rights – the Philippines 
5.1.1 Legal foundation 
The creation of a Commission on Human Rights in the Philippines was provided for in Article XIII, 
sections 17 – 19 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. This was followed up 
by Executive Order no. 163 which specified the mandate of the Commission. Until the Commission 
was formally set up, the Presidential Committee of Human Rights exercised the functions and 
powers of the Commission and Section 4 of the Executive Order dealt with the transfer of functions, 
powers and resources from the Committee to the Commission.  
 
The 1987 Constitution was a turning point in the history of the Philippines as it marked the end of 
the Marcos dictatorship and signalled the beginning of the new democratic era. Despite instability, 
democracy has survived in the ensuing twenty-year period. It was part of the new era to include a 
constitutional provision for a Commission, in the hope that this type of institution may prevent 
relapses into authoritarianism in the future. 
 
A constitutional foundation does not ipso facto guarantee a better functioning Commission, though 
it may be argued that a constitutional foundation does provide a more secure basis than a 
Presidential decree or an executive order. The implicit assumption is that a constitution may be 
harder to change than a decree from the executive.  
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5.1.2 Composition 
Section 2 of the Executive Order provides that the Commission is to consist of a Chairman and four 
members, all natural-born Filipinos above 35 years of age. None of the members must have stood 
for an elective position in any election immediately prior to their appointment.  During their term of 
appointment, members can not hold any other office or employment. Members can not engage in 
any profession or take part in the management of any business that may be affected by the functions 
of their office or in any way have a financial interest in any franchise or privilege granted by the 
government or any of its branches, agencies and subdivisions. 
 
These restrictions are of importance as the Chairman and the Commissioners are full-time positions. 
These are not part-time engagements as is the case for some of the other Commissions in the region 
and hence any division of loyalty should not apply. 
 
The Chairman and Members are appointed by the President for a period of seven years, which can 
not be extended. Generally, a longer period of tenure is better for guaranteeing independence than 
short-term tenure which will allow the government better opportunities for removing activist 
commissioners. However, all members are appointed for the same period, leading to a complete 
change of membership every seventh year.  
 
As the Commission members are appointed by the President, there is the possibility that political 
considerations of loyalty enter into the selection process. Potential candidates are screened by the 
Presidential Office staff, but the President is basically free to select candidates not on the short list. 
There are no indications that there is a process of wider consultation involved in the selection of 
Commission members. 
 
There are five members of the Commission and they share a common background in law, with one 
specialising in labour arbitration. The Chair, Purification C. Valera Quisumbing, is a lawyer by 
profession and has an extensive experience abroad, particularly related to the UN. All five have 
worked for the government of the Philippines, partly or fully. As the Commission only counts five 
members with a predominant legal and government background, it is doubtful whether it can be said 
to represent the pluralism of society in total. But all have extensive legal experience, including 
handling human rights cases in their capacities as lawyers (and for one member, looking after the 
interests of Philippine migrant workers). 
5.1.3 Financial and operational independence 
Section 6 of the EO provides that the approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be 
automatically and regularly released. But in practice, there is no automatic release of government 
funds. Budget items are subject to scrutiny and approval by the Department of Budget and 
Management and there are restrictions on transfers of funds from one budget item to the other and 
from one programme to the next. Staff reported that it has happened on occasion that parts of the 
budget have not been released or even reduced. The US State Department report on human rights 
practices for 2005 reports that “approximately one-third of the country's 42 thousand barangays had 
Human Rights Action Centers, which coordinated with CHR regional offices; however, the CHR's 
regional and subregional offices remained understaffed and underfunded. The CHR budget for the 
year was $3.59 million (P197.38 million), down 6 percent in peso value from 2004.”12  
 
Operational independence may be affected by the Commission assisting the Government in its 
performance of functions related to human rights protection and promotion. While there is nothing 
                                                     
12 See the Philippines report at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61624.htm. 
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inherently wrong in such assistance, the Commission may risk being too closely identified with the 
government and possibly having to share the blame if government service is not up to expectations. 
Its role as a government monitor may also be affected in the process if the Commission actively 
contributes to government reports under international human rights treaty obligations. According to 
an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was co-operation on the ICCPR report, but in 
general the Ministry chose to work with the relevant Congress committee. 
5.1.4 Mandate 
Section 3, the longest in the Executive Order, deals with the mandate, functions and powers of the 
Commission and consists of 11 points as follows:  
 
(1) Investigate on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations 
involving civil and political rights;  
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for 
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;  
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within 
the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures 
and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or 
need protection;  
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons or detention facilities;  
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education and information to enhance respect 
for the primacy of human rights;  
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide 
for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;  
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on 
human rights;  
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of 
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any 
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;  
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office or agency in the performance of 
its functions;  
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and  
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. 
 
As can be seen from the list, the mandate and powers cover both protective (1 – 4) as well as 
promotional functions (5 – 7) as per the Principles. The main accent, as far as the main human 
treaties are concerned, is on the civil and political rights and these are the primary concerns of the 
investigative work of the Commission which also includes forensic services. Legal services 
comprise aid and counselling, conciliation and mediation. Assistance, including financial assistance, 
is provided to victims of violations. Visitorial services also come under the protective function, in 
particular to prisons and other places of detention. 
 
The promotional programme of the Commission comprises first of all educational services. One 
element is the development of modules for teaching at elementary and secondary school levels. 
These were tested out over a number of years and revised following changes in the basic school 
curriculum. Another is the development of a Human Rights Education Facilitators Manual for 
teachers as the general knowledge of human rights among teachers is poor. This manual gives a 
general introduction to human rights and teaching human rights as well as more detailed 
information on child rights. A third component is the introduction of a teaching module to be 
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integrated into the curriculum of police and military education and training centres. Fourthly, 
training of trainers and teachers is an ongoing activity of the education services. 
 
Another promotional function is the monitoring of legal treaties ratified by the Government of the 
Philippines (see 7 above). The Instruments Monitoring Office carries out this function through its 
Treaties and Monitoring Programme. This programme provides advice to the government on its 
international obligations as well as in setting up national action plans. However, the Commission 
should not advise on how to comply with international standards, but rather independently monitor 
government reporting and prepare alternative reports if needed (as we shall see below).  
 
The Indicator Setting Programme is an initiative to monitor government performance in selected 
rights areas. A pilot study is being conducted on Rights Based Indicators on Selected ESC Rights 
with a focus on the right to food and health. This study involves looking at government performance 
based on government development plans and the MDGs, including the role of government 
departments and civil society organisations in the exercise. Data are drawn from both government 
sources and from outside NGOs with an expertise in health issues. Data collection is supplemented 
by interviews with informants and by dialogue with affected agencies along the way. 
 
Another module of the promotional functions is to inform the public about what the Commission 
does and accomplishes. This module is thought implemented in five parts: developing a 
Commission web site; a bulletin board system; a facility for on-line training; on-line documentation 
and a general web portal. The web site is up and running, though none of the other components are 
in place yet. The Commission is well aware of what remains to be done and says that in about 6 – 8 
months time the rest should be in operation.13 While setting up an online presence is a sign of 
progress, a major weakness is that the Commission has yet to publish an annual report, on paper or 
electronically on the Web. Statistical compilations of activities are published annually, but not 
generally circulated. While they may be handy for providing an inventory of activities, they are no 
substitute for an annual report which has to have at least a qualitative assessment of what has been 
done and what are the challenges and targets ahead. 
 
Yet another part of the promotional tasks is to develop linkages, both to the government sector and 
to civil society. The first linkage, to the government sector, is oriented towards operating an 
oversight function with reference to pending legislation and administrative orders and directions 
regarding compliance with international human rights standards. It has so far meant taking a CHR 
position on pending legislation, but as Commission staff admit on its web site, the resources for 
performing this task remain an issue: A major plan is “(t)o request the CHRP management for 
additional warm bodies to complement the unrealistically small composition of the Division 
otherwise, the functions and mandates of the LPD should be transferred to the Legal Office; where 
they properly belong”. 
 
Linkages are also to be forged with NGOs, civil society and media. This need has emerged as a 
result of a wide-spread perception that the CHRP did not have a highly visible public image and that 
potential users of its services were more likely to go to NGOs than to the Commission. Hence, the 
need to develop linkages in order to make CHRP services better known not only in society at large, 
but also within government. 
 
Finally, the Commission operates a number of special programmes, including a Right to 
Development programme, a Barangay Human Rights Action Center, a Child Rights Center, a 
Women Rights Action Center and an Asia – Pacific Institute of Human Rights, comprising 
                                                     
13 See the web site at http://www.chr.gov.ph/index.htm. As the page has not been updated, it is hard to say whether the 
Commission has fulfilled these objectives. 
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information, training and research centres and a publication unit. Again, info on activities and 
accomplishments are scarce. 
 
Does the Commission have any quasi-judicial powers? The question was put during the visit to 
CHRP main office in Quezon City, and according to information received, CHRP officials may be 
asked to deputise as prosecutors in child right cases following a Memorandum of Agreement with 
the Ministry of Justice. Whether this extends further is unclear as there is a need to distinguish 
human rights cases from those that do not fall under this rubric. What is clear is that the 
Commission has the mandate to provide legal assistance in the preparation of legal documents and 
to undertake visitations to centres of detention and to extend legal and other financial, medical 
assistance to inmates. The Commission has intervened in cases where the death penalty may be 
imposed and in cases of individuals imprisoned under the previous Marcos regime.14 Nonetheless, 
the brunt of protective functions concerns investigation and case management. 
5.1.5 Operational priorities 
As the former section on the mandate showed, the Commission is active within the entire spectrum 
of functions identified by the Paris Principles. The accent has been on the protective functions, 
specifically related to investigation, legal and other assistance and visitations. However, following a 
review of performance in 2002, priorities changed.15  
 
The review, undertaken by the Center for Public Resource Management, criticised the Commission 
for its “transactional” approach and advocated an “environmental” approach to supplement the 
transactional. This latter approach would have the purpose of investigating the structural causes of 
human rights violations. It is argued that “promotion and consequential protection must be 
deepened, widened and given more attention than what it is currently getting in as much as this 
intervention has deeper and longer-term impact on human rights awareness, societal capacity to 
assert and protect individual rights, and capacity to seek redress under the law”.16 Instead of a 
reactive stance, the HRCP should shift to a more proactive one. That would mean that instead of 
waiting for complaints to be received, the Commission should on its own initiative launch 
investigations and undertake visitations.17 It would also mean more attention to economic, social 
and cultural rights with a view to ensuring equity, equal opportunity, provision of resources and 
prevention of discrimination. 
 
Of the cases investigated, the review found that 40 per cent was filed with the courts or 
administrative agencies and only 10 per cent made it as far as a court judgement. There was no 
information as to whether these cases were appealed, or about the amount of time, resources and 
assistance rendered to get as far as a court judgement. However, the fact that only one out of ten 
complainants received judicial redress indicates that there is scope for improvement.  
Furthermore, the review criticised the HRCP for being too close to the government in a number of 
instances and for its inability to undertake independent monitoring functions, in particular of 
government obligations and functions, but also to effectively liaise with Congress on legislative 
matters. 
 
                                                     
14 Refer to the Supreme Court petition filed by the Chair and Commisioners of the HRCP for habeas corpus of Leonardo 
Pacquinto and Jesus Cabangunay, G.R. No. 115575, 4 August 1994. On file with the author. These two had been 
incarcerated for 20 years at the time of the petition, sentenced by a military tribunal in the Marcos era. 
15 See Center for Public Resource Management, Institutional Review of the Commission on Human Rights, January 2003, 
Pasig City, the Philippines. 
16 Institutional Review, ibid., p.2-23. 
17 The review found that the average workload for investigators in the regional offices in 2001 was one case per month, 
quite a pleasant workload, but obviously with scope for more to do! 
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In conclusion, the review recommended the following broad reform measures: 
 
• Shift from transactional protection activities (investigation of human rights cases, 
provision of legal services and referrals to  other agencies, forensic services, jail 
monitoring and financial assistance) to independent investigation and case monitoring; 
• Conduct of monitoring of the consequential aspects of human rights violations;18 
• Strengthening of research functions to provide analytic and experiential inputs for 
continuing improvement in the role, programs and interventions of the CHR and its 
linkages; and 
• Reengineering of the human rights programme towards strengthening public education 
and broad-based advocacy. 
 
In brief, the Commission was recommended to be less of a service provider and more of an 
independent monitoring agency. Resources freed up by this change of orientation could be fruitfully 
directed to monitoring. However, a change in orientation would also require a change in 
competence, which may not be available, in particular analytical skills. 
 
The non-availability of a competent staff profile is apparent from another exercise following from 
the performance assessment. The same company that did the assessment was tasked by UNDP to 
introduce the HRCP to the Rights-Based Approach (RBA) to Development.19 The purpose of the 
RBA is to mainstream human rights in development planning and to make sure that development 
and governance activities across the board are informed by human rights considerations such as 
equity, non-discrimination, participation, empowerment and so on. The Strategic Development and 
Planning Office of the HRCP is to be entrusted with the oversight functions, accompanied by both 
linkages offices, the Government Cooperation Office and the Civil Society Cooperation Office. The 
report goes on to describe the RBA in an elaborate 120-page document, with an abundance of flow 
charts throughout.  
 
Whether the HRCP is in the position to fulfil these new oversight functions will depend not only on 
resources, but of analytical skills considerably beyond the predominant legal skills among the 
current roster of commissioners. 
5.1.6 Effectiveness and impact 
It is beyond the Paris Principles to enquire into effectiveness and impact as the Principles are 
primarily concerned with the structural factors that will have to be in place for a commission or 
institution to function independently and properly. But as the review so far has indicated, 
effectiveness and impact have been limited. As the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network concluded 
in a regional review: “the Philippine Commission looks spectacular on paper: it is supported by the 
Constitution, detailed and varied legislation, and has numerous publications. However, its execution 
is poor. NGOs have little faith in the organization, perceiving it as the lackey of the government.”20 
This was the perception prior to the “reengineering” project and whether the reorientation has 
resulted in altering the public perception of the Commission is uncertain. However, there is reason 
to doubt it. To judge from the information provided by its web site, there are scanty indications as to 
whether the Commission has improved its outreach and accessibility. There are no indications 
                                                     
18 This is presumably to be understood as not looking at the consequences of human rights violations, but at structural 
factors that cause the violation of human rights.   
19 See CHR Reengineering Project. Rights-Based Approach (RBA) to Development. Center for Public Resource 
Management. Design Report. October 2003.  
20 See ”An Assessment of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights,” in National Human Rights Institutions in the 
Region. Report of the Alternate NGO Consultation on the Seventh Asia-Pacific Regional Workshop on National Human 
Rights Institutions. Delhi, Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, 2002, pp. 109-118. 
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whatsoever whether the Commission has been able to accomplish its objectives after the 
reengineering job; the available information speaks of objectives and not of accomplishments or 
benchmarks or progress rates. As a review concludes: “it is due to these factors that the CHRP is 
unable to reach its full potential. Its character precluded the possibility of success.”21 
5.2 SUHAKAM – The Malaysian Human Rights Commission 
5.2.1 Legal foundation 
SUHAKAM is founded on the Human Rights Commission Act 1999 which sets out the functions of 
the Commission as follows: 
 
(a) to promote awareness of and provide education in relation to human rights; 
(b) to advise and assist the Government in formulating legislation in relation to human rights; 
(c) to recommend to the Government with regard to the subscription or accession of treaties and 
other international instruments in the field of human rights; and 
(d) to inquire into complaints regarding infringements of human rights referred to in section 12.22 
 
In contrast to the Philippine and Thai commissions, the Malaysian commission does not have a 
constitutional anchoring.  
5.2.2 Composition 
The members of the Commission shall not exceed 20 in number. They are appointed by the Yang-
di-Pertuan Agong (the titular head of state) on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The 
members are appointed on the basis of prominence and from a variety of religious and racial 
backgrounds.23 The duration of tenure is two years, but with eligibility for reappointment. 
As with the Philippine commission, members are appointed by the executive branch giving the 
Prime Minister considerable influence (and the President in the Philippines) on who are to be 
appointed. Pluralism appears to be guaranteed, but there is no clause requiring that the members 
should have any prior familiarity with human rights or experience from working on human rights 
issues. The tenure of commissioners is only two years, thus giving the executive a high degree of 
control over who are reappointed. There are no criteria for reappointment, thus giving the executive 
wide discretion in deciding on reappointments, including failure to reappoint “troublesome” 
members.24 
 
When perusing the list of current commissioners, it is apparent that most have a government 
background, though some are academics at state universities or civil service unionists. It is 
dominated by Malays who comprise about two-thirds of Commission members. None of the 
                                                     
21 ”Philippines Commission. Stymied by its character”, Human Rights Features, August-September 2005, p. 6 (published 
by the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, New Delhi). 
22 See Laws of Malaysia. Act 597. Human Rights Commission Act 1999. Malaysia, Govt. Printing Office. 
23 It may be surprising that the word “racial” figures in official Malaysian discourse. It shall be taken to mean basically the 
Bhumiputras (or sons of the soil, comprising the Malays and other indigenous groups) and the Chinese and Indian 
populations. 
24 See the decision by several NGOs to boycott SUHAKAM for 100 days in 2002, partly due to the non-extension of 
commission members: “it is the perception of civil society that the Commissioners who have been dropped are among 
those who have actually discharged their statutory duties in the protection and promotion of human rights, without fear or 
favour,” at http://www.aliran.com/oldsite/monthly/2002/4j.html. It was also noted that the new Commission Chair was 
Attorney General at the time of wide-spread arrests in 1987 – 88 under the Internal Security Act. However, in his new 
capacity, he has taken a public stand against ISA. 
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members has a specific human rights background, and none of the human rights NGOs is 
represented on the Commission. 
 
The commissioners are only part-time and numerous in contrast to the Philippines commission that 
is small, but full-time. Arguably full-time commissioners would ensure a higher commitment to the 
Commission, though not necessarily a more efficient one. Conflict of interest issues may arise, and 
with only part-time commissioners, decision-making is going to be slower and more cumbersome. 
There are apparently no requirements for commissioners to meet more than once a month. 
5.2.3 Financial and operational independence 
According to Art 19 of the Human Rights Commission Act, the Government shall provide the 
Commission with adequate funds to enable the Commission to discharge its functions. The 
Commission can not receive any foreign funds, but funding can be from private or organisational 
sources provided it’s for promotional, educational purposes.25  
 
Funding does not come from parliament, as might be expected, but from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Initially, expenditure had to be approved by the Treasury, but as from 2001 the 
Commission has been able to manage its own funds independently. Whether the funding received is 
“adequate” is not known. 
 
Art. 22 of the Human Rights Commission Act provides that “(t)he Minister may make regulations 
for the purpose of carrying out or giving effect to the provisions of this Act, including for 
prescribing the procedure to be followed in the conduct of inquiries under this Act”. This can easily 
be interpreted to the effect that the Commission is not free to determine its own inquiry procedure, 
but in actual practice the Commission has been able to set its own procedures, though submitted to 
the Ministry for approval. 
 
The proof of independence is the ability to criticise the government when there are clear grounds for 
doing so. The inquiry into the Kesas Highway Incident in 2000, wherein the police broke up a 
meeting of an oppositional political group, produced a report that was critical towards the police. 
An inquiry was launched into the Kampung Medan Incident in 2001, wherein a private dispute 
turned into a communal riot, but it was, however, never published. Another case, the Damansara 
School case in 2001, concerning expropriation, was not taken up by the Commission. The general 
viewpoint of human rights activists has been that SUHAKAM could have been more vigilant and 
forceful and that it is too reactive and not proactive enough. 
5.2.4 Mandate 
The mandate, as we saw under section 2.2.1, covers both promotional functions (a,b) as well as 
protective functions (c,d). 
 
It is further specified under Art. 4(2) of the Human Rights Commission Act as follows: 
 
(a) to promote awareness of human rights and to undertake research by conducting 
programmes, seminars and workshops and distribute the results of such research; 
(b) to advise the Government and/or the relevant authorities of complaints against such 
authorities and recommend to the Government and/or such authorities appropriate 
measures to be taken; 
                                                     
25 It is not known whether funding can be channeled through sister human rights commissions in other countries as is the 
case for Komnas HAM in Indonesia. 
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(c) to study and verify any infringement of human rights in accordance with the provisions of 
this Act; 
(d) to visit places of detention in accordance with the procedures as prescribed by the laws 
relating to places of detention and to make necessary recommendations; 
(e) to issue public statements on human rights as and when necessary; and 
(f) to undertake any other appropriate activities as are necessary in accordance with the 
written laws in force, if any, in relation to such activities. 
 
Art. 4.2 (a,b,e) addresses promotional functions and Art. 4.2(c,d) protective functions, thus fulfilling 
both parts of the mandate of a commission as per the Principles. 
 
With reference to 4.2(d), there is a drawback in that the Commission is expected to announce its 
visits well in advance, giving prison authority sufficient time to present a better picture of 
conditions than if visits were unannounced. Hence the Commission has been considering 
announcing the visit on the same day of the actual visit, thus keeping an element of surprise. But 
these rules do not apply to the secret places of detention of those detained under the Internal 
Security Act where the government may choose to delay requests for visit and to insist on officials 
being present under inquiries. 
 
However, as Article 4(4) provides, “regard shall be had to be the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 1948 to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the Federal 
Constitution.” Malaysia has not ratified any of the two main human rights conventions 
and is thus not bound by its provisions. The Declaration is technically speaking a non-
binding instrument, though it has come to be regarded as an integral part of customary 
international law. There is no presumption on the part of Malaysia that it takes 
precedence over domestic law and as such Malaysia practices a dualistic system of 
legal administration. 
 
The protective function under (d) is further specified under Art. 12 regarding the powers of inquiry 
of the Commission: 
 
12(1) The Commission may, on its own motion or on a complaint made to it by an aggrieved 
person or group of persons or a person acting on behalf of an aggrieved person or a 
group of persons, inquire into an allegation of the infringement of the human rights of 
such person or group of persons.  
12(2) The Commission shall not inquire into any complaint relating to any allegation of the 
infringement of any human rights which (a) is the subject matter of any proceedings 
pending in any court, including any appeals; or (b) has been finally determined by any 
court. 
12(3) If the Commission inquires into any allegation under subsection 12(1) and during the 
pendency of such inquiry the allegation becomes the subject matter of any proceedings 
in any court, the Commission shall immediately cease to do the inquiry. 
 
The law is quite specific in denying any quasi-judicial function to the Commission; the task of the 
Commission is purely to investigate and refer conclusions and recommendations to the relevant 
authority, usually the Home Ministry or the Prime Minister’s Office. This limitation of mandate 
deprives the Commission of any direct interaction with the judicial system. However, the 
Commission does have subpoena powers during investigations and inquiries and can hear evidence 
that may be inadmissible in civil or criminal courts and grant immunity to witnesses in cases under 
investigation, provided that information given is truthful and not deliberately fabricated.    
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5.2.5 Operational priorities 
The Commission has organised the commissioners into five separate working groups; the Human 
Rights Education and Promotion Working Group, the Complaints and Inquiries Working Group, the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Working Group, the Law Reform and International Treaties 
Working Group (and the Management and Finance Committee). This structure is replicated in the 
divisions of the regular staff which adds a Legal Division, a Public Affairs Division, a Policy and 
Research Division (and a Management and Finance Division).  
 
It is a sensible move to focus the work of the Commission on a limited set of subjects and to work 
systematically to come up with recommendations. Each working group has been studying topics 
relevant to their brief. The Law Reform group has focused their attention on the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) particularly as well as on a fair and expeditious trial. The Economic and 
Social Rights working group has looked into the Millennium Development Goals focusing on 
extreme poverty and hunger, universal primary education and gender equality. The Education group 
has looked at CRC and made the Universal Declaration available in Bahasa Malaysia.  
5.2.6 Effectiveness and impact 
The disadvantage of being an advisory body is that it is only advisory. The Commission has no way 
of enforcing its recommendations. The first Chair of the Commission said in 2000: “As far as 
Suhakam is concerned, we are not an enforcement institution. We are more an institution that is 
advisory and gives a power of moral persuasion not only to government but to all”.26 The 
government may choose not to listen to any of the advice given and Parliament may not be given 
the opportunity to debate the conclusions and recommendations given. The Commission is required 
to produce an annual report to be tabled in Parliament by the Government. However, the report is 
submitted indirectly; it is sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which forwards it to parliament 
after vetting its contents. The majority government party has prevented discussions of the report 
despite motions by opposition party MPs.  
 
SUHAKAM is not receiving a lot of mainstream media attention. Media associated with the 
governing coalition are less likely to provide regular coverage than oppositional media such as the 
online Malaysiakini “newspaper” which, according to the editor, covers SUHAKAM closely. 
 
SUHAKAM has unfortunately not been successful in persuading the government to ratify the two 
main human rights conventions or to repeal the Internal Security Act which opens for long-term 
detention without trial. However, the annual reports now contain a section of government response 
to the recommendations and the Commission’s comments to the response. As a review of 
SUHAKAM concludes, “Malaysia is still in the early stages of transition towards being a nation 
built solidly on the principles of democracy, accountability and transparency.27 It’s not 
SUHAKAM’s fault that it has to deal with a political environment that is slow to change in the 
direction of more democratic space. In a system in which the government always knows best, it 
requires a long haul for alternative voices to be heard and seriously considered. 
                                                     
26 See ”SUHAKAM – Yet to Earn its Spurs,” in National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific Region, p. 85. 
27 Ibid., p. 90 
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5.3 Komnas HAM – The Indonesian Human Rights Commission 
5.3.1 Legal foundation 
The Indonesian Commission was set up by Presidential Decree No. 50 in 1993 which was later 
modified in the Human Rights Act no. 39 of 1999.28 The Act laid down the objectives of the 
Commission as follows in Chapter 7, Art. 75: 
 
(a) to develop conditions conducive to the execution of human rights in accordance with 
Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, the United Nations Charter, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; and 
(b) to improve the protection and upholding of human rights in the interests of the personal 
development of Indonesian people as a whole and their ability to participate in several 
aspects. 
 
In order to achieve these aims, “the National Commission functions to study, research, disseminate, 
monitor and mediate human rights issues (Art. 76(1). 
 
The timing of the establishment of the Commission, just prior to the World Conference on Human 
Rights in 1993, was by many observers seen as a move to deflect criticism of the Suharto regime at 
the time, responsible for serious human rights violations in East Timor, Aceh and Papua (formerly 
Irian Jaya). The imprint of the Suharto era is also evident in the reference to Pancasila, the official 
State philosophy at the time, with its belief in the five principles of God, humanity, nationalism, 
representative government and social justice. 
 
With the adoption of the Act in 1999, the Commission was given a statutory foundation, but not a 
constitutional one as those of Thailand and the Philippines.  
5.3.2 Composition 
Initially in 1993, the membership of the Commission was appointed by the President and their 
actual names were listed in Presidential Decree No. 455 of that year (followed by Decree No. 476 
concerning the Commission’s election of Chair and Vice Chairs). 
 
The only criterion for the selection of members in the 1993 Decree was that the membership should 
consist of “national prominent figures” (Art 7). There was no trace of the Paris Principles’ criterion 
of pluralism. Members sit for a period of five years, but can be extended for another five years, 
making ten years the maximum duration of service for any member.  
 
The brunt of the “nationally prominent” membership consisted initially of elite figures close to the 
Suharto government. One worrying factor was that former military officials were represented on the 
Sub-commission for monitoring the execution of human rights, the entity most directly engaged 
with protective functions. However, with the renewal of the Commission in 1998, the Commission 
decided the new composition of the Commission on its own accord. 
 
                                                     
28 Presidental Decree No. 50 of 1993, and Decrees 455 and 476 can be found in National Human Rights Institutions in the 
Asia-Pacific: A Source Book, published by the Human Rights Center, Atteneo de Real University, Manila, the Philippines.  
The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia. Republic of Indonesia Legislation Number 39 of 1999 
concerning Human Rights, on file with the author. 
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The selection procedure was modified by the 1999 Act in the sense that the 35 members are now 
selected by the House of Representatives, but on the recommendation of the plenary of the 
Commission. While it does allow for more autonomy on the part of the Commission, it does entail 
the danger that current members will have a larger degree of control over membership, thus making 
it difficult to bring in new and outside members. As the selection procedure is closed and not in any 
way open to public intervention, the likelihood of any radical changes in membership is low.  
 
The current Commission comprises 23 members composed of lawyers, ex-judges, ex-military 
officers, Muslim organisations, minority religions, human rights NGOs and women and children 
NGOs. Nine members of the current membership have an NGO background. 
 
The commissioners are only engaged part-time in commission work, and approximately half of the 
commissioners attend the Commission on a daily basis. Plenary meetings are twice a month. 
 
The Commission has its nation-wide network through a combination of branch offices and local 
commissions with about 70 staff employed. There has been a frequent complaint from out-lying 
parts of the country that the Commission is too Java-based with inadequate presence outside.  
5.3.3 Financial and operational independence 
The funding for the Commission comes from the Government. In its annual report for 2001, the 
Commission reports that the state funding only covers the running costs of the Commission. Special 
top-up funding had to be sought for financing the investigatory work related to large-scale human 
rights violations. In addition to government funding, the Commission receives funding from donor 
sources, some of it directly from the Norwegian29 and Dutch governments and some channelled 
through sister commissions in Australia and Canada.30 As special funding has to be sought for 
investigative work, the dependence on the government is deepened. 
 
As for operational independence, observers have noted the practice of clearing commission 
statements with military officials before releasing them to the public at large. Further reports of 
non-transparent decision-making threaten the integrity of the Commission.31 These reports refer to 
practices in and around 2000. It is not known whether matters have improved in the changed 
political environment of present-day Indonesia. 
5.3.4 Mandate32 
The mandate of the Commission is as follows, as stated in the 1999 Act, Art. 89, is as follows:  
 
(a) to study and examine international human rights instruments with the aim of providing 
recommendations concerning their possible accession and ratification; 
(b) to study and examine legislation in order to provide recommendations concerning drawing 
up, amending and revoking of legislation concerning human rights; 
(c) to publish study and examination reports; 
(d) to carry out literature studies, field studies, and comparative studies with other countries; 
                                                     
29 The Norwegian government has for a number of years operated a Human Rights Dialogue with Indonesia, particularly 
focused on the courts and the judicial system. 
30 See National Commission on Human Rights Indonesia, Annual Report 2001, ch. 9, financial report, pp. 213-6. 
31 See Komnas Ham – The Indonesian National Human Rights Commission: The Formative Years, Human Rights 
Documentation Center, Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, New Delhi, 2000, p. 11. 
32 From 1999, there is also the Minister of State for Human Rights and the divisions of powers and responsibilities 
between the Minister and the Commission is not clear. The Minister can also receive complaints from individuals and 
groups. 
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(e) to discuss issues related to protecting, upholding and promoting human rights; and, 
(f) to conduct cooperative research and examination into human rights with organizations, 
institutions and parties, at regional, national and international levels. 
 
The above list refers to general promotional functions and does not mention the protective functions 
at all. These functions are given in a separate sub-paragraph in which monitoring includes 
investigating and examining incidents likely to constitute violations of human rights; call on 
complainants, witnesses and accused to hear their statements and to give written statements and 
submit necessary documents33; and to survey places of incidents. 
 
Finally, and of particular interest, the Commission can, on approval of the Head of Court, provide 
input to cases currently undergoing judicial process if the case involves violations of human rights 
of public issue and court investigation. This provision is significant as it opens for Commission 
intervention in court cases involving human rights violations.34  
 
Complaints can come from individuals or from groups, provided that the complainant can be seen 
as a representative of the group in question. Complaints can be oral, but the finalised complaint 
must be in written form.  
 
The Commission can decide to set up ad hoc teams to look at cases of gross and wide-spread human 
rights violations, including looking into the 1965 – 66 events, drawing upon complaints from 
victims’ families and relatives. Estimates of people disappeared and believed killed, range from 
300,000 up to several million. At the time of visiting the Commission, commissioners were in 
disagreement about the conclusions and the report remained unpublished. The Commission decided 
to set up a review team to investigate into the disappeared, but had not decided to go ahead with an  
 
In general, court admissibility is contingent on the case being a human rights case, the complaint 
being in good faith and the case not being resolved by an appropriate agency. 
 
The 1999 Act also provides for Human Rights Tribunals to be set up within the ambit of District 
Courts, but this opportunity has been little used, with the exception of incidents related to East 
Timor. 
 
An alternative method of responding to complaints has been to offer mediation and conciliation 
services, but there have been discussions within the Commission whether this represents the best 
use of limited resources as many of the cases, typically involving land and labour issues, fall outside 
the human rights rubric. 
 
On the promotional side, there are a number of tasks the Commission has attended to. The 
Commission has tried to convince the Government to ratify the main human rights conventions. 
There are a number of discriminatory laws regarding passports, ID cards and birth certificates. As 
there are only five recognised religions, and the religious denomination has to be entered, this 
leaves the residents of Chinese extraction in a quandary as the Chinese cannot be subsumed under 
any of the five and hence cannot be issued ID cards and other papers of documentation of personal 
identity. 
 
                                                     
33 The Commission does have subpoena powers, but it’s hardly invoked. 
34 The possibility of amicus curiae briefs, which this paragraph opens up for, has reportedly not been utilised. 
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There are plans for training in Pro Justitia, i.e. how to conduct fact-finding inquiries into gross 
human rights violations35 and to better co-ordinate human rights monitoring among NGOs with a 
particular focus on Aceh and Makassar in Sulawesi. Co-operation with foreign sister commissions 
will continue.36 
5.3.5 Operational priorities 
As from 2004, the sub-commissions will be divided into separate entities for civil and political 
rights, economic, social and cultural rights and vulnerable groups. 
 
There does not appear to be any major change in organisational priorities. Komnas HAM identifies 
the following priorities for its work plan up to 2008: 
 
• Improving the performance of Komnas HAM to achieve its legislative mandate, including 
under decentralisation; 
• Protecting Human Rights Principles, preventing potential violations and investigating and 
acting on violations that have already occurred; 
• Building the networks between Komnas HAM and human rights stakeholders; 
• Promoting national and regional governments to adopt human rights principles  in the 
implementation of development programs; 
• Empowering society to be actively engaged in upholding, promoting and protecting human 
rights; and 
• Encouraging the ratification of international human rights instruments.37 
 
The plan specifies a number of steps to take with regard to internal management, decentralisation 
and the relationship to other institutions, both domestically and abroad. 
 
Perhaps the most significant change would be to establish a much stronger local presence in line 
with overall decentralisation of the governance system in Indonesia and to correct the perception of 
the Commission being too Java-centric.The importance of outreach and accessibility is also one to 
consider for Komnas HAM.   
5.3.6 Effectiveness and impact 
The overall verdict on the Commission is not unexpectedly mixed. The Commission has been 
making strong statements about military and police transgressions in a number of instances. Yet 
there are structural deficits to attend to: lack of pluralism in membership (though improving), 
oversized commission with not enough regular staff, inadequate outreach and accessibility, lack of 
enforcement power (and low utilisation of mandate opportunities), lack of transparency due to 
confidentiality and off- the-record procedures of persuasion. 
 
Co-operation from the Government is not exactly forthcoming as this story brings out: “in 2003, 
Komnas HAM's efforts to expose human rights violations and bring perpetrators to account were 
undermined by a number of court decisions regarding its jurisdiction or authority. For example, in 
June 2003 a Jakarta court refused to subpoena former and active military officers who had ignored 
Komnas HAM summonses to face questioning about the 1998 riots, which claimed more than 1,200 
                                                     
35 This is part of the Indonesia programme at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Komnas HAM staff was provided 
training in Pro Justitia procedures this year. 
36 The Raoul Wallenberg has been donating human rights literature to the Komnas HAM library, with SIDA funding.  
37 See The Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), Co-operation Plan 2003 to 2008. May 
2003. 
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lives. In June the armed forces stated it could not cooperate with attempts by Komnas HAM to 
summon retired and active-duty generals to answer questions about the abduction of pro-democracy 
activists between 1997 and 1998. The armed forces insisted that Komnas HAM must first obtain 
permission from the House of Representatives before it could summon retired and active-duty 
generals for questioning. By law severe human rights violations that occurred before 2000 could be 
investigated only by an ad hoc human rights court, not Komnas HAM. Such a court could be 
formed only at the suggestion of the House, but for the House to know enough about an incident to 
approve the formation of a court, a thorough investigation was necessary.”38 A classic case of catch 
22 if there ever was one! 
 
Similar to the Philippine Commission, outreach via online sources appears to be quite limited. The 
site is only in Bahasa Indonesia, and no annual reports or other summaries of activities appear to be 
available online. Hence it is extremely difficult to make any assessment about recent events and 
developments. 
 
Indonesia is still at an early stage in the transition towards democracy and there is a need for 
institutions to hold Government accountable. If Komnas HAM were to address its structural 
deficits, it could be a force in that process. 
6. Concluding observations 
Summing up, we may set out some of the structural features in tabular form. 
 
Table 1. Structural Features of three Southeast Asian commissions 
Features/Commission Indonesia Malaysia Philippines 
Legal basis Decree, Act Act Constitution, 
Executive Order 
Size of commission Large Large Small 
Tenure Long, part-time Short, part-time Long, full-time 
Mandate Broad: protective, 
promotional 
Broad: protective, 
promotional 
Broad: protective, 
promotional 
Quasi-judicial functions Investigations into past HR 
violations 
None Limited 
Financial independence Govt. funding, extra funding 
for investigations, foreign 
funding 
Govt. funding, own 
management of budget 
Govt. funding, at 
times inadequate 
Operational 
independence 
Occasional clearing of 
statements 
Vetting by Foreign 
Ministry 
No known 
interference 
Outreach Some branch offices, local 
commissions 
Some branch offices Many branch 
offices 
Effectiveness and 
impact 
Mixed Mixed Mixed 
 
As can be seen from the table, all three are based on law, but only the Philippine has a constitutional 
underpinning. The size of the commission varies, with the Philippine opting for a small commission 
which has the further distinction of being full-time. A small commission would under normal 
assumptions be a more efficient decision-making body. A large one may better ensure pluralism in 
                                                     
38 See the report on Indonesia at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61609.htm, the US State Department’s annual review 
of human rights practices throughout the world. 
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its membership. The Malaysian commission is the odd one out in having a very short tenure for 
commissioners which gives the appointing authority more powers of control over membership.  
 
All three commissions have a broad mandate, covering both protective and promotional functions, 
but there are distinctions between them as regards quasi-judicial functions. The Indonesian 
commission does have the opportunity to investigate past human rights abuses, but this opportunity 
is, as we saw, hedged with constraints. 
Regarding independence, only the Philippine commission appeared to be financially constrained 
whereas other constraints concerned the operational independence of the others. 
 
The Philippine commission has a better outreach than the others, but this advantage did not appear 
to be efficiently exploited. Finally, as regards output factors, the picture is mixed and none of them 
can be said to be particularly successful in achieving their objectives. This may be due to structural 
features or due to constraints in the political environment. 
 
However, we may also make some qualitative concluding observations, drawing on another 
checklist compiled by the International Human Rights Council. 
 
The International Council has set up a set a list of criteria for what distinguishes an effective 
national human rights institution.39 These criteria may also serve as benchmarks against which to 
assess the three institutions under review. 
 
First, an institution should enjoy public legitimacy. All three commissions are often perceived as 
being an extension of the Government. Even though a commission cannot be an NGO, 
independence from government is guaranteed to enhance public legitimacy. 
Second, institutions should be accessible. We have seen that all three institutions tend to be reactive 
rather than proactive, to wait for complaints instead of making independent investigations based on 
news reports and other sources. We did also see that the quality of online information differed 
greatly, with an obvious effect on accessibility. Accessibility also has to do with local presence and 
here the Philippine commission had a wider network, although by and large underutilised.40 
 
Institutions should have an open organisational culture. As we have seen, most of the commissions 
are dominated by former government officials and given the elite composition of most of the 
commissions, it is doubtful whether a culture of openness will develop. 
 
Institutions should ensure the integrity and quality of their members. As we saw, two of the 
commissions have only part-time members and are at the same time quite oversized. A smaller, full-
time membership with members familiar with human rights will ensure both higher integrity and 
loyalty. 
 
Institutions should have diverse membership and staff. As we noted above, a preponderance of ex-
public officials is not the best way to guarantee that pluralism is reflected in the membership. Civil 
society organisations are as a rule underrepresented even though Indonesia appear to have more 
diversity, however, at the price of an oversized commission. 
 
Institutions should consult with civil society. Networking with civil society has been identified, as 
we saw, as a primary task for both the Philippine and Indonesian commissions. The Malaysian 
                                                     
39 International Human Rights Council, Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions. Versoix, 
Switzerland, 2005. 
40 Komnas HAM was quite accessible in a specific sense as one of their buildings provided temporary housing for about 
100 displaced people. 
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commission has instituted a series of dialogues across government – civil society boundaries, but 
relations with the NGOs were at one time so strained that a 100 day symbolic boycott was 
instituted. 
 
Institutions should have a broad mandate. All three have a broad mandate, covering both 
promotional and protective functions. 
 
Institutions should have an all-encompassing jurisdiction. All three have a wide, though not all-
encompassing jurisdiction. Military and special forces are not off limit to the commissions, and the 
Indonesian commission has kept a higher profile on these issues, basically due to their powers to set 
up ad hoc teams to investigate cases of gross human rights violations. However, there are 
contentions regarding the functioning of human rights tribunals for past violations. 
 
Institutions should have power to monitor their recommendations. This power is largely absent, 
although the changed role for the Philippine commission would give it considerable monitoring 
powers of government performance, though it is far from certain whether it is in a position to 
exercise it.  
 
Institutions should treat human rights issues systematically. All three deal systematically with 
human rights issues, basically through a system of working groups and sub-commissions. However, 
there is always the danger that it may be difficult to demarcate human rights issues from those that 
are not. All three also push for ratifications of main treaties and in some cases aid the government in 
its reporting obligations to the treaty bodies. 
 
Institutions should have adequate resources. As we saw, the Philippine commission complained 
about resource inadequacy and irregularity while the Malaysian appeared to be most in control over 
its own budget. Some commissions accept foreign funding, others do not. 
 
Institutions should develop effective international links. This question is slightly outside the scope 
of the review, but suffice it to say that all three participate in both regional and global forums. The 
Indonesian Commission has a close relationship with other sister institutions abroad, though this 
does not seem to be case for the other two. 
 
Institutions should handle complaints speedily and effectively. As we saw above, this question 
touches on accessibility as well as the powers to monitor the implementation of its own 
recommendations. This ability differs across the three commissions, particularly with regard to the 
judicial system.  
 
All in all, the benchmarks of effectiveness indicate that there is considerable scope for improvement 
of all three. However, it should be considered that the commissions operate in difficult political 
environments with countries in a slow transition to a democratic dispensation and with a 
considerable legacy of authoritarianism and a strong government to contend with. 
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SUMMARY
The report studies three human rights commissions in Southeast Asia in light of the so-
called Paris Principles. These principles are the authoritative guidelines for directing the 
work of national human rights institutions. Designed as agencies for both the promotion 
and protection of human rights, these entities occupy an important intermediate position 
between the state and civil society. They are to serve as public watchdogs over the state 
and to be accessible to the public at large as agencies investigating complaints about 
state wrongdoing and as sources of education and training for raising human rights 
awareness.
The report makes an assessment of the legal mandate, composition, independence, 
operational priorities and to the extent possible, the effectiveness and impact of the 
three commissions in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Although the assessment 
finds that the three fulfil the requirements of the Paris Principles, there is still 
considerable room for improvement for all three. All three commissions are also found 
to vary in significant respects and this variation is sought summarised in a concluding 
table. Finally, some recommendations are made as to how the performance of the 
commissions can be bettered. 
 
The general weakness of the commissions is that their mandates are not as encompassing 
as they should be and that they have few powers to make sure that their recommendations 
are followed once they are submitted to the relevant government authority. The strict 
separation between the commissions and the courts also derives the commissions of 
any judicial function.
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